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Introduction
Over one hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that the
"most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is
that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of
acting in common with them. The right of Association therefore... [is]
as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty."'
The United States Supreme Court has found certain constitutional
rights implicit within the First Amendment,2 one such right being free-
dom of association. "[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly described
[freedom of association] as among the preferred rights derived by impli-
cation from the First Amendment's guarantees of speech, press, petition,
and assembly." 3 The Court formally recognized freedom of association
as a fundamental right in NAACP v. Alabama.4
A recent controversy involving freedom of association has revolved
around discriminatory practices of all-male private clubs and organiza-
tions, including the United States Jaycees and Rotary International.5
These clubs have challenged state and local statutes requiring them to
accept applications from women for full membership,6 and have unsuc-
cessfully argued that their right to freedom of association has been vio-
lated by the enactment of these statutes.7 In both Roberts v. United States
1. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (1985).
2. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1010 (1988).
4. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court made references to freedom of association in decisions
previous to NAACP v. Alabama. See Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of
Association and Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1192.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 19-65.
6. See infra note 69 for an example of one such statute.
7. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1988, at Al, col. 4; N.Y. Times, January 31, 1988, § 1 at 42,
col. 3.
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Jaycees8 and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte,9 the Court upheld state civil rights laws banning gender-based
discrimination, ruling that neither organization had had its associational
rights violated.l°
In June of 1988 the Supreme Court issued its decision in New York
State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York," again holding that the
right to freedom of association does not protect "private clubs" 2 from
local laws making it illegal to discriminate on the basis of gender. 1 In
this case, however, the Court addressed the issue in a somewhat different
manner than it had in either Roberts or Rotary. The Court for the first
time stated that some organizations subject to anti-discrimination stat-
utes may nevertheless be entitled to associational protection. 4 Thus,
NYSCA may mark the turning point in this area of constitutional law.
This Comment will explore how the Supreme Court has limited the
expressive associational rights of private clubs. It will also examine the
possible emergence of a new interpretation of intimate associational pro-
tection. Part I describes the two leading cases that preceeded NYSCA,
Roberts v. United States Jaycees 5 and Board of Directors of Rotary Inter-
national v. Rotary Club of Duarte.I6 Part II presents the facts and hold-
ing of New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York.I7 Part
III analyzes the Court's restriction of associational rights within private
organizations. The Comment concludes that although the Court has in-
dicated a new willingness to extend association rights to members of pri-
vate clubs under limited circumstances, it has also voiced its reluctance
to accept another such case in the near future, suggesting that the states
should resolve these challenges on a case-by-case basis.
8. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
9. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
10. See infra Parts I and II for a detailed description of the holding in each case.
11. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) [hereinafter NYSCA].
12. In this case, private clubs were defined as those clubs that meet the three pronged test
of the New York City statute. Id. at 2230. See infra note 69 for the specific language of the
New York City statute.
13. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2231. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of
Appeals judgment, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d
915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987), upholding Local Law 63 against a facial attack on its
constitutionality.
14. See generally notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
15. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
16. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
17. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
I. Background: Existing Law
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
i8
In Roberts, the Court was required to "address a conflict between a
State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination against its citi-
zens and the constitutional freedom of association asserted by members
of a private organization."' 9 The Court upheld the Minnesota Human
Rights Act2" against claims that it violated the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of the organization's members.2'
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, began by ana-
lyzing freedom of association "in two distinct senses." 22 According to
Brennan, these distinct associational rights are the rights of "intimate
association" and "expressive association."23 Brennan explained that
"[iln one line of decisions, [this] Court has concluded that choices to
enter into and maintain certain human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relation-
ships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our consti-
tutional scheme."'24 In another set of decisions, addressing expressive
association, the Court has recognized the "right to associate for the pur-
pose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise
of religion."25
Brennan pointed out, however, that "the nature and degree of con-
stitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depend-
ing on the extent to which one or the other aspect . . . of the
constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case."' 26 There-
fore, the Court considered separately the effect the statute had on the
Jaycees' freedom of intimate association and .on their freedom of expres-
sive association.
L Freedom of Intimate Association
The Court left open the exact criteria necessary for intimate associa-
tion protection, noting only that family relationships are definitely pro-
18. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
19. Id., at 612.
20. The Minnesota statute provided, in pertinent part, that "[ilt is an unfair discrimina-
tory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because
of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd.
3 (1982).
21. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
22. Id. at 617.
23. Id. at 618.
24. Id. at 617-18.
25. Id. at 618.
26. Id.
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tected.27 In considering and then rejecting the Jaycees' claim, the Court
listed a number of relevant factors "[w]ithout precisely identifying every
consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional protection
.... "28 These factors "include[d] size, purpose, policies, selectivity, con-
geniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be perti-
nent."29 The Court found that "[i]n this case, however, several features
of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside of the category of
relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection.
30
The Court noted that undisputed facts revealed the Jaycee chapters
were large and unselective. 31 No criteria for judging applicants was used
except age and gender.32 Furthermore, women attended meetings and
participated in various functions despite being unable to hold office, vote,
or receive certain awards.33 The Court thus concluded that "[i]n short,
the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective [and]
much of the activity . . . involves the participation of strangers ....
Accordingly, we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive
characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision
of its members to exclude women."34
2. Freedom of Expressive Association
The Court next examined whether the Jaycees were entitled to pro-
tection of their expressive association rights.35 The Court explained that
it has "long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.",36 It then stated, without anal-
ysis, that the Jaycees did in fact participate in various "protected activi-
ties.",37 Therefore, a central question of the case became the weight the
Court was willing to give these protected activities.
The Court noted that certain government actions can infringe upon
27. Id. at 619-20.
28. Id. at 618.
29. Id. at 620.
30. Id. (emphasis added).




35. Id. at 622.
36. Id.
37. Id. Later in the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the Jaycees regularly engage in
lobbying, fundraising, and other activities "worthy of constitutional protection under the First
Amendment .... " but nonetheless concluded that admitting women as full voting members
would not impair the Jaycees' ability to continue these activities. Id. at 626-27. See also infra
notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION
this right of expressive association. 38 Such infringements include penal-
ties or withholding of benefits from individuals because of membership in
an organization, 39 and forced disclosure of membership lists;40 the gov-
ernment may also "try to interfere with the internal organization or af-
fairs of a group. '41 The Court acknowledged that the Minnesota law in
question "works as an infringement of the last type."'4 It then stated
that "[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the
group to accept members it does not desire."
43
Despite acknowledging that an infringement of associational rights
had taken place, the Court emphasized that "[t]he right to associate for
expressive purposes is not ... absolute."'  Infringements are allowed if
the statute is adopted to serve compelling state interests, does not relate
to suppression of ideas, and cannot be achieved through less restrictive
means." The Court then held that Minnesota's "compelling interest" in
eradicating gender-based discrimination justified any impact the statute
might have on the Jaycee members' associational freedoms.46
The Court next explained why, despite an admitted infringement of
associational rights, the Minnesota law did not interfere with the organi-
zations' ideologies or philosophies.47 The majority deemed this an im-
portant issue in balancing the State's compelling interest against the
organizations' associational rights.48 Noting once again that the Jaycees
already allowed women to participate in a broad range of the organiza-
tions' activities,49 the Court concluded that the Jaycees' claim that the
admission of women to their membership would impair or alter the or-
ganization's message was "attenuated at best."
50
After discussing the lack of merit in the Jaycees' claims, the Court
declared, "In any event, even if enforcement of the [Minnesota] Act
causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate
38. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
39. Id. at 622-23 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-84 (1972)).
40. Id. (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92
(1982)).
41. Id. at 623 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87
(1982).
46. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
47. Id. at 626-27.
48. Id. at 626.
49. Id. at 627.
50. Id.
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purposes." 5 In effect, the Court created a balancing test weighing the
state's compelling interests in eliminating invidious discrimination
against the associational rights of the Jaycees.12 In so doing, the Court
announced for the first time that the state's goal of eradicating invidious
discrimination was to be considered a compelling interest.
5 3
B. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte54
This 1987 case involved the California Unruh Civil Rights Act,5
which had been challenged in the same manner as the Minnesota statute
in Roberts.16 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, followed the same
two part analysis of freedom of intimate and expressive association as the
Court had in Roberts,57 and similarly declined to offer freedom of associ-
ation protection to the Rotarians.5 8
The majority again recognized that family relationships were the
type of relationship that deserved intimate association protection, 59 not-
ing, however, that "[o]f course, we have not held that [this] constitu-
tional protection is restricted [only] to relationships among family
members.",60 The Court restated the distinctive characteristics necessary
to qualify for such protection, including size, purpose, and exclusion of
others from activities. 6' The Court found that the evidence indicated the
relationship among the Rotary members was not the kind that deserved
intimate association protection, noting that the size of chapters ranged
from twenty to more than 900 members, that there was a high drop-out
rate, and that many activities were carried out in the presence of
strangers.62
51. Id. at 628.
52. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 116 (1986).
53. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory
Membership Policy Of A National Organization Held Not Protected By First Amendment Free-
dom Of Association, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1055, 1080 (1985).
54. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
55. The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other
physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1989).
56. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539.
57. Id. at 544-45.
58. Id. at 546.
59. Id. at 545.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
62. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546-47.
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On these facts, the Court also held that Rotary was not entitled to
expressive association protection, stating, "Even if the Unruh Act does
work some slight infringement on [a] Rotary member's right of expres-
sive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the State's
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.",
63
Thus, the California Rotary chapters could be subjected to the provisions
of the Unruh Act.64
In addition to solidifying the Supreme Court's stand in this area of
law, and giving weight to Roberts as a precedent, the Rotary opinion is
significant for its statement in footnote six. The Court stated that "we
have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First
Amendment protects the rights of individuals to associate in the many
clubs and other entities with selective membership that are found
throughout the country."'65 It was this footnote that prompted the attor-
ney for the New York State Club Association to declare that "[the
NYSCA] appeal presents to the Court the very question expressly left
open in Rotary. 
' 66
II. New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York 
67
A. The Facts
On October 23, 1984, the mayor of New York City signed Local
Law 63, which amended New York City laws prohibiting invidious dis-
crimination by organizations that are not in their nature "distinctly pri-
vate."'68 The amendment 69 specifically defined three criteria that would
automatically make a club or organization a public accommodation, thus
63. Id. at 549.
64. Id. at 547, 549 & n.8.
65. Id. at 547-48 n.6.
66. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 6, New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836).
67. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
68. Brief for Appellant at 5, New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836).
69. Local Law 63 of 1984 amended § B1-2.0(9) of the N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE to add
the following definition:
An institution, club or place of accommodation shall not be considered in its nature
distinctly private if [1] it has more than four hundred members, [2] provides regular
meal service and [3] regularly receives payment for dues, fees, usage of space, facili-
ties, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmem-
bers for the furtherance of trade or business. For the purposes of this section a
corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benev-
olent orders law but formed under any other law of this state, or a religious corpora-
tion incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law shall be
deemed to be in its nature distinctly private.
New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 393, 505 N.Y.S.2d
152, 153 (A.D. 1986).
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falling within the anti-discrimination laws.7°
Immediately after the amendment was passed, a consortium of 125
private clubs, calling itself the New York State Club Association, filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law 63 was unconstitu-
tional under the New York Constitution.7" The lower court ruled
against the association,72 and the association lost its appeals both to the
Supreme Court Appellate Division and to the New York Court of Ap-
peals.73 The association then appealed the New York decision to the
United States Supreme Court,74 seeking a declaratory judgment that Lo-
cal Law 63 was unconstitutional on its face because the statute violated
the consortium's first and fourteenth amendment rights to freedom of
association.75
B. The Holding
Although the Court ruled on several areas of substantive law, this
Comment will discuss only the freedom of association issues. After mak-
ing an initial determination of standing,76 Justice White, writing for the
majority, 77 addressed the issue of facial challenges to statutes.
L Facial Challenges
The Court first stated that since this was a facial challenge to the
statute, the appellant could attack the constitutionality of Local Law 63
70. The New York State Club Association claimed in its brief that an irrebuttable pre-
sumption was established by meeting the three criteria established by Local Law 63. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 68, at 6. Therefore, clubs meeting the three criteria would automatically
be subject to the law. Id. The City of New York claimed that lower court rulings character-
ized the criteria in Local Law 63 as "permissive" and as such the law did not create an irrebut-
table presumption. Brief for Appellee at 18, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (86-1836). See also Brief for Appellant, supra note 68, at 23 n.ll.
71. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 216, 505
N.E.2d 915, 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (1987).
72. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505
N.Y.S.2d. 152 (A.D. 1986).
73. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d
915, 513 N.Y.S.2d. 349 (1987); New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 118
A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152 (A.D. 1986).
74. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2229.
75. Brief for Appellant, supra note 68, at 8-11.
76. The Court established that the consortium had standing to sue by applying its three
part test established in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977). The Court held that appellant met all three criteria even though appellee objected to
standing only on the first part of the Hunt test. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2232.
77. Justice White wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in parts I, II, and III and an
opinion of the Court for part IV, in which all the justices joined except Justice Scalia. Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia wrote an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
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in only two established ways,7" by demonstrating that "the challenged
law either 'could never be applied in a valid manner' or that even though
it may be validly applied to the [appellant] and others, it nevertheless is
so broad it 'may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third
parties.' -79
In order for the first type of facial challenge to succeed, a court must
find that" 'every application of the statute create[s] an impermissible risk
of the suppression of ideas.' "80 The second type of challenge will suc-
ceed only if the statute is " 'substantially' overbroad, which requires the
court to find 'a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the Court.' "81 The Court was unpersuaded that appellant could
make a valid claim for either facial challenge.8 2
2. Intimate and Expressive Associational Rights
Before beginning its analysis of associational rights, the Court noted
that the association had conceded at oral argument that Local Law 63
"could be constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs,
under this Court's decisions in Rotary and Roberts." 3 Therefore, at the
outset, at least some of appellant clubs could not claim a violation of
their constitutional rights.
Regarding lack of intimate association, the Court stated that these
"characteristics [the requirements of Local Law 63] are at least as signifi-
cant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations, because of
the kind of role that strangers play in their ordinary existence, as is the
regular participation of strangers at meetings, which we emphasized in
Roberts and Rotary." 4 Although conceding that "there may be clubs
that would be entitled to constitutional protection despite the presence of
these characteristics ... [T , 5 the Court asserted that "it cannot be said
that Local Law 63 is invalid on its face because it infringes the private
associational rights of each and every club covered by it."
' s6
The Court used similar reasoning regarding the contention that Lo-
cal Law 63 infringed upon every club member's right of expressive asso-
ciation, stating that it might be possible for an association to show it is
organized for expressive purposes, thus deserving constitutional protec-
78. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
79. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
80. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798 n.15).
81. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801).
82. Id. at 2233-34.
83. Id. at 2233.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2234.
86. Id.
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tion.87 The Court noted, however, that since the record before it showed
no specific evidence of any such purposes, it could "hardly hold other-
wise" than finding there was no violation of the club's constitutional
rights. 88
III. Constitutional Analysis
In New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, the
Supreme Court for the third time denied intimate or expressive associa-
tion rights to a private organization. Yet the Court has not definitively
established a test for determining associational rights under these cir-
cumstances. This is not to say, however, that the Court does not provide
some guidance.89 One commentator defended the Court's reluctance to
be more definitive:
The Court's reluctance to formulate a categorical response to the
antidiscrimination/private organization question is understanda-
ble. The issue may prove to be one of the most problematic areas
in constitutional law because ... it is an issue beset with inherent
conflict and tension. The most obvious conflict raised, for exam-
ple, involves the two virtual first principles of contemporary consti-
tutional law: freedom and equality. The right to choose one's
associates (freedom) is pitted against the right to equal treatment
(equality), a most fundamental conflict.9°
Drawing a line between freedom and equality is difficult "[b]ecause the
interests on both sides are so strong .... [Therefore,] resolving the issue
with a per se rule vindicating only one side is not possible."91
The Court's decisions in Rotary and NYSCA have established a
somewhat restrictive view of expressive association rights. Despite this
pattern of restriction, the Court's latest language in NYSCA suggests that
the Court will go no further in restricting associational rights and may
possibly allow a more expansive use of intimate association rights.
A. Intimate Association Rights
The Court held in Roberts that the U.S. Jaycees, a large organiza-
tion with great public exposure, did not have the "distinctive characteris-
tics"92 to obtain constitutional protection of intimate association. 93
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The Court referred to certain criteria in all three opinions such as size and selectivity.
See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a detailed description of these criteria.
90. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68, 69
(1986).
91. Id. at 71.
92. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984); see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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Though initially applauded by some,9 4 the opinion drew critical com-
ment. One commentator wrote that "[i]f hard cases make bad law, easy
cases sometimes do no better, and [Roberts] is a good example ...
[N]either Justice Brennan's balancing approach nor Justice O'Connor's
commercial/expressive dichotomy adequately captures the competing
values." 95
Another commentator wrote that
[b]ecause it recognizes the legitimacy and importance of the com-
peting interests, the Roberts case is useful 'as a point of orienta-
tion.' It is not adequate, however, as a guide to deciding future
cases. This is true primarily because the case for the state, as inter-
preted by the Court, was so one-sided." 96
The Court's holding in NYSCA was similar to its holding in Roberts.
It afforded no intimate association protection and liberally cited Roberts
in making its decision.97 Nonetheless, both the opinion of the NYSCA
Court and Justice O'Connor's concurrence contain language that goes
beyond Roberts regarding intimate association rights, and may therefore
influence future rulings.
The Court first noted that the three characteristics required by Lo-
cal Law 6398 were at least as significant as the criteria in Roberts and
Rotary in determining "the nonprivate nature of these associations." 99
The Court then stated:
Although there may be clubs that would be entitled to constitutional
protection despite the presence of these characteristics [the three
parts of Local Law 63], surely it cannot be said that Local Law 63
is invalid on its face because it infringes the private associational
rights of each and every club covered by it.' o°
In both Roberts and Rotary, the Court acknowledged that freedom
of intimate association was not limited to family relationships, but then
cited only cases dealing with family relations.1' In NYSCA, however,
the Court acknowledged for the first time that a specific organizational
relationship may be entitled to intimate association protection. 0 2 There-
fore, one interpretation of the NYSCA holding is that, although the
94. See Sitomer, Club Doors Pushed Open a Bit More for Women, Christian Science Moni-
tor, June 21, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
95. Rhode, supra note 52 at 117. O'Connor's test is discussed more fully infra in text
accompanying notes 103-121.
96. Marshall, supra note 94, at 74 (quoting Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1878 (1984)).
97. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 69 for the criteria of Local Law 63.
99. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
100. Id. at 2234 (emphasis added).
101. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984); Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-46 (1987).
102. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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Court ruled that a facial attack would not succeed in this case, it left
open the invitation to an individual private club to make a fact-based
claim that it has the distinctive characteristics sufficient to claim intimate
association protection.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence also suggests a new direction in this
area of law. 103 O'Connor stated that
[i]n a city as large and diverse as New York City, there surely will
be organizations that fall within the potential reach of Local Law
63 and yet are deserving of constitutional protection. For example,
in such a large city a club with over 400 members may still be
relatively intimate in nature, so that a constitutional right to control
membership takes precedence.'
°4
O'Connor thus seems willing to extend associational rights beyond the
intimate relationships of family life. 105
In her next sentence O'Connor continued: "Similarly, there may
well be organizations whose expressive purposes would be substantially
undermined .... 106 From the context of this statement it is clear that
O'Connor distinguishes the two distinct associational rights. It therefore
appears that the Court" 7 may be willing to extend intimate association
rights to private clubs under proper circumstances.
1 08
B. Expressive Association Rights
As with intimate association rights, the NYSCA opinion and
O'Connor's concurrence suggest an easing of the Court's restrictive
103. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence in Roberts that set forth her test for these cases.
Those clubs organized primarily for expressive purposes would receive constitutional protec-
tion, whereas those clubs organized primarily for commercial purposes would receive "only
minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association." Roberts, 468
U.S. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). See also infra notes 115-126
and accompanying text for a further discussion of O'Connor's concurrences.
Justice O'Connor took no part in the Rotary decision because her husband was a member.
Note, Rotary International and Freedom of Association: Better Late than Never, 15 W. ST.
U.L. REV. 217, 238 (1987).
104. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
105. See supra notes 27 & 59-60 and accompanying text.
106. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. The Court in NYSCA also observed that "there may be clubs that would be entitled to
constitutional protection despite the presence of these characteristics .. " Id. at 2234. See
also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Thus, it appears that all the members of the
Court would be willing to give constitutional protection under the proper set of facts.
108. What these proper circumstances are will most likely be the next case to come before
the Court. The NYSCA decision indicates that only a single private club would have a chance
to make the proper showing. A single club, however, may not have sufficient financial re-
sources to litigate a case to the Supreme Court level. One private all-male club in San Fran-
cisco has estimated that legal costs in its court battle with the city attorney could top one
million dollars. The City of San Francisco is attempting to enforce a statute similar to Local
Law 63 against several private clubs. Himelstein, Bias Suit Defense Fees Loom, The Recorder,
Feb. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
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stance regarding expressive association rights. The Court stated that the
New York City law does not, "[o]n its face,... affect 'in any significant
way' the ability of individuals to form associations[,] . . . nor does it
require the clubs to 'abandon or alter' any activities that are protected by
the First Amendment." 10 9 The Court added, however, that
"[ilt is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to
show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it
will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effec-
tively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the
same sex, for example ... ."11l
The Court nonetheless concluded that on the record before it, "it seems
sensible enough to believe that many of the large clubs covered by [Local
Law 63] are not of this kind." '' Despite this conclusion, the Court ac-
knowledged that it was possible for some clubs falling within Local Law
63 to still be eligible for expressive association protection.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated, "[T]here may well be
organizations whose expressive purposes would be substantially under-
mined if they were unable to confine their membership to those of the
same sex,... or who share some other such common bond. The associa-
tional rights of such organizations must be respected.""' 2 Although
O'Connor concluded that since the New York City law could be applied
to at least some of the clubs, it was not invalid on its face," 3 she indi-
cated a willingness to give expressive association protection to at least
some clubs.
The Court has acknowledged that there may be some clubs that are
entitled to expressive association protection despite the state's compelling
interest. Thus, the only definitive ruling in this line of cases is that large,
unselective organizations like the Jaycees and Rotary clubs are not enti-
tled to expressive association protection."
4
C. Justice O'Connor's Expressive-Commercial Test
In Roberts, O'Connor suggested that the Court had not gone far
enough in allowing States to pursue antidiscrimination actions and had
offered insufficient First Amendment protection to those clubs deserving
it. Rather than applying the Court's "compelling interest" balancing
test," 16 O'Connor would prefer an "expressive-commercial" test.' '7 Her
109. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2234 (citations omitted).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. See generally supra Part I.
115. Note, supra note 53, at 1082-83; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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test would be one of determining simply whether the organization was
involved in commercial or expressive activities.
1 18
O'Connor conceded, however, that "[n]o association is likely ever to
be exclusively engaged in expressive activities, if only because it will col-
lect dues from its members or purchase printing materials or rent lecture
halls or serve coffee and cakes at its meetings." 119 Therefore, in her view,
"an association should be characterized as commercial, and [thus] sub-
ject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other
associational activities, when, and only when, the association's activities
are not predominately of the type protected by the First Amendment."12
In her NYSCA concurrence, Justice O'Connor did not make her ex-
pressive-commercial test the main issue of her opinion. Rather, she used
the test to determine that some clubs were not entitled to constitutional
protection.121 O'Connor first acknowledged that the existence of some
clubs deserving expressive association protection did not invalidate Local
Law 63.122 Then, without further comment, she stated that
[p]redominantly commercial organizations are not entitled to
claim a First Amendment associational or expressive right to be
free from the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law.
Because Local Law 63 may be applied constitutionally to these or-
ganizations, I agree with the Court that it is not invalid on its
face. 123
O'Connor's test, unlike the majority's test, "avoids any requirement
that the group demonstrate a change in content or message of its
speech."124 The relative simplicity involved in determining the level of
expressive speech versus commercial activity results in a more practical
test than forcing defendants to prove that admission of women would
alter their protected activities. 125 O'Connor's test may therefore prove
more useful to lower courts that have to decide cases based on
NYSCA.126
Conclusion
In the three cases dealing with gender discrimination in private
clubs, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness
to uphold the constitutionality of state antidiscrimination laws. This has
117. Note, supra note 53, at 1082.
118. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. Note, supra note 53, at 1083; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. Note, supra note 53, at 1084.
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provided for some movement within the all-male priVate clubs toward a
more open admission policy.'27 It also has encouraged more cities to
pass laws against gender discrimination and prosecute clubs that refuse
to adhere to these laws.'
28
On the other hand, NYSCA may represent the turning point in this
area of constitutional law. While upholding a New York City anti-dis-
crimination law against a facial attack, the Court suggested for the first
time that certain clubs, though falling within the coverage of the law,
may nonetheless be exempt from it. Furthermore, the Court expressed
for the first time a possible willingness to grant intimate association
rights to groups other than those involved in family relationships.
The most difficult barrier to pursuing such a case to the Supreme
Court is reflected in the Court's strong language that these cases can be
settled on a case-by-case basis within the administrative bodies of the
states.129 The Court may be reluctant to take another case soon, and the
requirements of appealing the administrative process may well cause
many clubs to determine that the cost of appealing a case is
prohibitive.'
For the moment, a woman's right to admission to previously all-
male clubs has been firmly established. Nevertheless, it would be naive
to think that eliminating gender-based discrimination by legal fiat will
end this social problem. As one commentator noted, "Getting women
into the right clubs is far easier than getting them to the right tables."''
By Anthony L. Leto*
127. For example, the Century Association agreed to admit women if the Supreme Court
upheld Local Law 63. See Norman, Century Club says It Will Admit Women if City Bias Law
is Upheld, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at B6, col. 3.
128. See All-Male Clubs Give Ground, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, § 1 (Northeast Journal),
at 42, col. 5; Himelstein, Bias Suit Defense Fees Loom, The Recorder, Feb. 23, 1989, at 1, col.
2.
129. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2235; see also 108 S. Ct. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. See, Himelstein, Bias Suit Defense Fees Loom, The Recorder, Feb. 23, 1989, at 1, col.
2.
131. Rhode, supra note 52, at 128.
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